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LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR FAILURE TO WARN INEXPERIENCED SER-
VANT OF DANGERS OF EMPLOYMENT.
In the late case of Fletcher Bros. v. Hyde, 75 N. E. 9, the Ap-
pellate Court of Indiana handed down an interesting opinion
upon the question of the liability of a master, who, without in-
struction or warning, knowingly directed an inexperienced em-
ployee to aid in the moving of certain trusses and assigned to him
a dangerous position, where, by reason of the breaking of the ap-
paratus supporting the truss and the employee's ignorance of the
method of handling the same, and of the proper manner in which
to protect himself, such employee was seriously injured. It must
be remembered that each state has its own regulations in regard
to liability in such cases. Notwithstanding this, there seems to
be a strong tendency amongst the authorities, as seen by
the adjudicated cases, to the effect that the master is liable in
such cases, even where the danger is obvious. Neither an em-
ployer or any other proprietor has a right to direct an employee to
do a particular act, and expect that employee to take precautions
against dangers unknown to him. It may frequently happen that
the dangers of a particular position for, or mode of doing work,
are great, and apparent to persons of capacity and knowledge of
the subject, and yet a party from inexperience, ignorance, or
general want of capacity and knowledge may fail to appreciate
them. It would be a breach of duty on the part of the master to
expose a servant of this character, even with his own consent, to
such dangers, unless with instructions or cautions sufficient to en-
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able him to comprehend them, and do his work, with proper care
on his part, with safety. A service which involves obvious dan-
gers may be performed in comparative safety by one of experience,
or sufficient instruction, while the same service will be attended
with almost certain injury if attempted by one who has had
neither experience or instruction. In such a case, the employer,
who, with knowledge of the want of experience of an employee,
nevertheless, without instruction or warning, exacts from him
a service which requires the observance of extraordinary caution
or the exercise of peculiar skill in order that an apparent danger
may be avoided, may be liable for the injury. By. Co. v. Wright,
rx5 Ind. 378; Ryan v. Tarbox, 135 Mass. 294; Sullivan v. Man.
Co. 113 Mass. 396. It is a well known rule that a servant when
he enters upon employment which is from its nature necessarily
hazardous. assumes the usual risks and perils of the service, and
this is especially so as to all those risks which require only the
exercise of ordinary observation to make them apparent. In such
cases, there is held to be an implied contract on the part of the
employee to take all the risks of the service, and to waive any
right of action against the employer arising from such risks.
Engine Works v. Randal, xoo Ind. 293. The severity of these
principles, however, is relaxed measurably in favor of employees,
in case the danger is not open to observation or ordi-
nary inspection, or in case the employee is known not to be of
sufficient capacity or experience to appreciate the dangers, or to
know how to perform the requisite service, and yet avoid the ob-
vious hazard. Pittsburgh v. Ry. Co. xo5 Ind. i5.
It must be presumed that an employee will not undertake to
perform labor or operate machinery concerning which he has no
knowledge or experience. Hence, his willingness to undertake
the work is sufficient to warrant the employer in assuming that be
is competent, unless, as in the present case, it is shown that the
master knows to the contrary. Nail Co. v Connelly,8 Ind. App. 398
The decisions, however, in other jurisdictions seem to favor a
less stringent rule in regard to the liability of an employer in such
cases. Thus it is held that the master is not bound to exercise the
highest possible diligence to instruct the employee in every con-
ceivable particular of the circumstances in which he might be
placed, or in every possible detail of his conduct in the per-
formance of his duties. The requirement in this respect is only
that the employer exercise ordinary and reasonable care to see
that the employee possesses a competent knowledge of the peculiar
dangers to which he is exposed in doing his work, and the pre-
cautions necessary to be taken to guard himself against those dan-
gers; and in the exercise of that care the master has the right to
assume that the servant brings to the work ordinary intelligence
and power of observation, and the capacity to learn something by
observation. Oberlies v. Bullinger, 27 N. Y. Supp. r6; De Forrest
v. Jewett, 23 Hun. 4. If the servant is ignorant of the method of
operating certain machinery with which he is to work, it is his
duty to inform the employer, and if he conceals his inexperience,
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and undertakes to work with the machinery, with the operation
of which he is unfamiliar, and is injured by reason of his inex-perience, the employer is not answerable therefor. When a ser-
vant undertakes to engage in a master's service, and to perform
certain duties, the master has a right to assume that he is quali-fied to perform the duties of the position he seeks to occupy, and
competent to apprehend and avoid all obvious hazards of such
service. Bellows v. Ry. Co. 157 Pa. St. 51. The great weight of
authority, however, based upon a review of all the decisions
seems to favor the strict application of the rule in regard to the
master's liability and where he knows that the employee is inex-perienced it is his duty to warn and instruct him, however ob-
vious and apparent the dangers of the employment may be.
Murthy v. Mairs, 6 N.Y. St. 42; Atkins v. Thread Co. 104 Mass. 431.
PERFORATED MUSIC ROLLS NOT SHEET MUSIC WITHIN MEANING OF
COPYRIGHT LAW.
"Copyright is the exclusive right of the owner to multiply
and to dispose of copies of an intellectual production." DroneCopyright, ioo. Musical compositions were first protected under
the statute 8 Anne, 18. In this country they were for the first
time specifically protected in 1878. Musical composers had cer-
tain rights in their productions at common law, but now their
rights depend wholly upon the provisions of the copyright act,
such former rights having been superseded by statute. Holmes v.Hurst, 74 U. S. 82. An action for penal damages lies for the un-
lawful representation or performance of a dramatic or musical
composition, and if the unlawful representation or performance isgiven wilfully and for profit, it is a misdemeanor, punishable byimprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. U. S. Comp.Stat. (19o), p. 3 415. The copyright in musical compositions is
more extensively protected than the copyright in dramatic pieces.Russet v. Smith, IS Sim. 18r. The same principle which holds
good in regard to books is applied to maps, charts, pictures, musi-
cal compositions, etc. The test is not whether the piratical pro-duction is an exact copy of the original, but whether it is substan-
tially copied. Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story 768. It is true that in
some parts of the statutes the words "book," "print," and "musi-
cal composition," refer to the intellectual conception as the essen-
tial element, and in other parts may refer more particularly to
the material form in-which it is expressed; but nowhere does
either element exclusively exist, because no intellectual concep-
tion can be copyrighted until it has taken material shape. Oliver
Dilson Co. v. Littleton, 67 Fed. 905.
The question whether or not perforated sheets of paper couldbe an infringement of copyrighted sheet music was first decidedin x888, by the case of Kennedy v. AfcTammany, 33 Fed. 584. In
that case the defendant manufactured perforated papers which,
when used in organettes, produced the music alleged to be pirated.As was said in that decision, to the ordinary mind it is certainly a
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difficult thing to consider such strips of paper as sheet music.
There is no clef, no bars, no lines, no spaces, nor any other marks
such as are found in common printed music, but only plain strips
of paper with rows of holes or perforations. They are not made
to be addressed to the eye as sheet music, but they form a part of
the machine. They are not designed to be used for such pur-
poses as sheet music, nor do they in any sense occupy the same
field as sheet music. They are a mechanical invention made for
the sole purpose of performing tunes mechanically upon amusical
instrument. Their use resembles more nearly the barrel of a
hand organ or music box. It is said that sheet music may consist
of different characters or devices, and that the perforated strips
are simply another form of musical notation; but the reply to this
is that they are not designed or used as a new form of musical
notation. While it may not be denied that some persons by study
and practice, may read music from these perforated strips, yet as
a practical question in the musical profession, or in the sale of
printed music, it may be said that they are not recognized as
sheet music. In Stein v. .Rosey, 17 App. D. C. 562, it was at-
tempted to be shown that the wax cylinder of a phonograph was
an infringement upon sheet music. The court in that case con-
cluded that the marks upon the wax cylinder could not be made
out by the eye and therefore could not be utilized in any other
way than as parts of the mechanism of the phonograph. This
peculiar use of a phonograph instead of copying the music in the
sense of the copyright act, to the injury of the publisher, would
rather seem analogous to that of one, who, having purchased the
sheet music of the publisher, proceeds to perform it continually
in public for his own profit.
The leading English case on this proposition is Boosey v.
Whight, L. R. 1899, which was decided under an act defining
copyright as "the sole and exclusive liberty of printing and other-
wise multiplying copies." Here it was held that perforated
papers, used in an Aeolian, which represented the instrumental
music of certain songs, were parts of the instrument and not
sheets of music within the act.
The late case of White-Smith Music Co. v. AAyollo" Co., 139
Fed. 427, which is analogous to the cases heretofore mentioned,
decides that a written musical conception, which has been copy-
righted is not infringed by a perforated record or sheet designed
for use in an automatic piano-player. Much stress is laid upon
the fact that the perforated paper is not a copy within the mean-
ing of the act.
